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‘By contraries execute all things’
Figures of the savage in European philosophy
Alberto Toscano
‘Savages’were invented in theOldWorld but encountered
in the New.
J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion
It is imperative to accept the idea that negation does not
signify nothingness; that when the mirror does not re-
flect our own likeness, it does not prove there is nothing
to perceive.
Pierre Clastres, ‘Copernicus and the Savages’
The savageOther
The call to decolonise philosophy demands, among other
things, a preliminary assessment of the shaping power of
the colonial relation across the discipline’s history. Such
an inquiry involves an excavation of how the European
encounter with, and exploitation of, other peoples con-
ditioned the different forms taken by the problem of
anthropological difference.1 My concern in this essay is
to explore how philosophers adopted, adapted and trans-
formed – and in a sense invented – the figure of the sav-
age from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth century.
In particular, I want to examine the varying and some-
times contradictory ways in which the savage emerged as
the living negation or inverted image of civilisedWestern
humanity. I have been greatly inspired in this undertak-
ing – of which this essay is but a preliminary sketch –
by two still-untranslated landmark works of philosoph-
ical historiography by Italian scholars, Sergio Landucci’s
Philosophers and Savages and Giuliano Gliozzi’s Adam
and the New World.2
From Horkheimer and Adorno’s location of anti-
Semitism within the Dialectic of Enlightenment to Said’s
Orientalism, from Beauvoir’s The Second Sex to Cedric
Robinson’s Black Marxism, the critical history of Western
philosophy and rationality has abounded in explorations
of the intimate if often obscured bonds between the spec-
ulative subjection of Otherness and its social, material
counterparts. The blatant instrumentality of the idea of
the savage to the colonial project, from the Spanish con-
quest to the ongoing dispossession of indigenous people
across the globe, would appear to militate against any
sustained or nuanced investigation. Surely, we are deal-
ing with the bluntest of racist and legitimising myths,
to be fought politically rather than ruminated academ-
ically? In what follows, I want to propose that contrary
to this justifiable but reductive reflex, there is much to
be gained from an investigation of the uses to which the
idea of the savage was put by European thinkers in the
crucible of colonial modernity – mainly, perhaps, for a
historical understanding of the politics of philosophy it-
self, but also to gain some insight into the contradictory
endurance of colonial imaginaries in the present.
The idea of the savage played a critical role in the
emergence of modern political philosophy, and the sub-
sequent unfolding of the ideologies of progress and the
social sciences of development: classical political eco-
nomy, anthropology, sociology. In the period of this in-
tellectual ferment, in a Europe wracked by inner turmoil
and external conquest – which is to say amid the throes
of the colonial emergence of a capitalist world from the
matrix of Christian feudalism – the savage was figured
largely with reference to the encounter with the indi-
genous people of North America, albeit drawing, as the
term’s etymology suggests, on an intra-European ima-
ginary of the homo sylvaticus, the man of the woods.3
Though preceded by images of Otherness that drew on
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narratives of conquest and encounter in the Caribbean
and Brazil (as we’ll see below with Montaigne), it was
with reference especially to so-called ‘Canadians’ that
modern philosophy sought to draw speculative and norm-
ative lessons from what appeared as savage difference.
As Pocock has observed, the Americas became ‘a vast
laboratory in which European speculative experimenters
[tested] their hypotheses regarding the human mind’.4
Thefirst philosophical appearance of European philo-
sophy’s ‘Canadians’ seems to have come with the debate
among supporters and objectors to Descartes’ account of
the innateness of the idea of God’s infinity. The engineer
and physicist Pierre Petit argued that the absence of such
an idea among the indigenous people encountered by
French colonists offered empirical proof of the falsity
of the Cartesian deduction. This view appeared in the
1641 ‘second objections’ to theMeditations. ‘Canadian
philosophy’ as a locution actually appears in the 1707
inaugural lecture of a German professor Jonas Conrad
Schramm, responding to the writings of the Baron de
Lahontan (to whom we’ll return in the conclusion, and
who instead referred to indigenous people as ‘Americ-
ans’) – where he speaks, paraphrasing Aristotle on the
origins of Greek philosophy, of the ‘stammering’ philo-
sophy of the native peoples of so-called ‘New France’.
Jacob Brucker’s five-volume critical history of philosophy
(1742-44) would also include a lengthy entry on the
‘Philosophy of the Canadians’, as would Diderot’s En-
cyclopaedia, presenting their ‘natural religion’ as a kind
of spontaneous deism.5
What kind of ‘Other’ is the savage? At first, and per-
haps second and third glance too, the savage seems to
differ from theOthers that have somagnetised twentieth-
century critical thought, lacking the unsettling, subvers-
ive qualities which reason’s confrontation with alterity
is often deemed to have. In his suppressed 1961 pre-
face to History of Madness, Michel Foucault envisaged
a history of limits that would interrogate a culture from
the (in some sense impossible) vantage point of its ex-
terior, a hollowed-out void or tear ‘by means of which
it isolates itself, [and which] identifies it as clearly as
its values’,6 forming the hidden basis of its historicity.
Foucault drew here on Nietzsche’s identification of the
origin of European metaphysics in the forgetting of the
experience of the tragic. He presented not just madness
(or unreason) as such a site of tragedy’s foreclosure, but
also dreams (or the unconscious), and the Orient. These
were all ‘limit-experiences of the Western world’, each
one of which, ‘at the frontiers of our culture, traces a limit
that is simultaneously an original division’.7 Reflecting
recently on the articulation of difference, otherness and
exclusion in the phenomenon of racism, Étienne Balibar,
in dialogue with Edward Said’s Orientalism, presents the
latter as a paradigmatic study of something like an ‘es-
sential’ Otherness, an ‘uncanny double’, ‘who is not only
an adversary but embodies a negation of one’s moral
and aesthetic and intellectual values, an Other who, at
the same time, in the most contradictory manner, has to
be constructed as a passive “object” of representation,
study, dissections, classifications, and an active “subject”
of threats, or simply of an alternative path to civilisation
and salvation’.8 This is an immanent and constitutive
alterity.
Does the savage represent such an alterity, such that,
to continue with Balibar,
the construction of the Other is the construction of an
alienated Self, where all the properties attributed to the
Other are inversions and distortions of those vindicated
for oneself, where indeed the Self is nothing but the
Other’s Other, whose identity and stability is perman-
ently asserted and secured (in the imaginary) through
the representation of an essential Other, or an essential-
ised Other, whose identity in this respect arrives from the
Other in inverted form?9
The answer is mixed. On the one hand, as I explore be-
low, the savage is in some sense the ‘perfect Other’, the
product of a matrix or accumulation of negations: he is
exactly what ‘we’ are not. On the other, largely because
of the simplistic formalism of this negation, the savage
is rarely if at all the occasion for a limit-experience or
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an uncanny encounter, serving at best as the locus of
ironic reversal and scepticism about the vaunted virtues
of the ‘civilised’ – no doubt also an effect of the reli-
ance of these philosophical texts on missionary literat-
ure already steeped in a classical and Christian image of
Otherness, rather than on the encounters between set-
tlers and First Nations.10 As Sergio Landucci observes,
perhaps the savage is really the caput mortuum of West-
ern political philosophy.11 This was the term – literally
‘the dead head’ – used by alchemists to describe the ex-
hausted residue of their experiments. By analogy, the
philosophical idea of the savage could be regarded as the
sterile product of negating the distinctive and itemisable
characteristics of Western political anthropology.
Antitypes
As Landucci has explored with daunting erudition, and
as Ter Ellingson has amply corroborated in his compel-
ling critique of anthropology’s racial legacies, The Myth
of the Noble Savage (2001),12 the figure of the savage
is a product of ‘comparative negation’, to use Elling-
son’s helpful formulation. Landucci starts his periodisa-
tion of philosophy’s invention of the savage with Mon-
taigne’s famous essay ‘Of the Cannibals’, which, in John
Florio’s early seventeenth-century translation, includes
the following lines referring to the native populations en-
countered by French colonists and missionaries in Brazil:
It is a nation, would I answer Plato, that hath no kind of
traffic, no knowledge of letters, no intelligence of num-
bers, no name of magistrate, nor of politic superiority;
no use of service, or riches or of poverty; no contracts,
no successions, no dividences, no occupation but idle; no
respect of kindred, but common, no apparel but natural,
no manuring of lands, no use of wine, corn, or metal.13
In Montaigne, this logic of negation, or privation,
was intended to frame the radical diversity he regarded
as consubstantial with human nature, and to sceptic-
ally puncture the superior pride of the civilised, both
by relativising the very category of ‘barbarism’ and by
proposing that the savage’s greater closeness to nature
condemned the ‘bastardising’ effects of our artificial cus-
toms. To paraphrase Foucault’s treatment of Erasmus’
In Praise of Folly, this was a critical-ironic rather than a
tragic critique of Western polity and rationality.14 Re-
lying, by his telling, on a naïve and thus more reliable
witness, Montaigne would then fill in the framework of
otherness or difference-by-negation with the description
of forms-of-life – anthropophagy, above all – which were
incommensurable enough with our own to undermine
the dominant doctrines that defined something like a
universalising political anthropology of the Middle Ages:
the Christian consensum gentium and Aristotle’s vision
of man as a zoon politikon. Though the uses and effects
of Montaigne’s savage, in which negation and difference
heralded a sceptical and ironic suspension of Europe’s di-
visive confidence in its own superiority, were sui generis,
and though his attempt at a dispassionate description of
indigenous forms of life was unique for his day, the logic
of comparative negation was not.
In one of the very first travel narratives from the ‘New
World’, a famous letter to his patron Lorenzo de Medici,
the Florentine navigator Amerigo Vespucci declared:
They have no cloth either of wool, linen or cotton, since
they need it not; neither do they have goods of their own,
but all things are held in common. They live together
without king, without government, and each is his own
master. Theymarry asmanywives as they please; and son
cohabits with mother, brother with sister, male cousin
with female, and any man with the first woman he meets.
They dissolve their marriages as often as they please, and
observe no sort of law with respect to them. Beyond the
fact that they have no church, no religion and are not
idolaters, what more can I say? They live according to
nature [secundum naturae], and may be called Epicureans
rather than Stoics. There are no merchants among their
number, nor is there barter. The nations wage war upon
one another without art or order.15
In 1505, a version of Vespucci’s privative description
would caption one of the first visual representations of
Amerindian peoples in Europe.16
Columbus’ own 1493 letter, announcing his great
‘discovery’, spoke of the natives of ‘Hispaniola’ as hav-
ing ‘no iron and steel, nor any weapons, nor are they fit
thereunto’. In 1511, Peter Martyr d’Angheria, in another
landmark text for the European perception of the indi-
genous peoples of the Americas, would write in similar
terms:
Lande is as common as the sunne, and water; Myne
and Thyne (the seedes of all mischeefe) have no place
with them.... A fewe thinges contente them, havyng no
delyght in suche superfluities, for the whiche in other
places menne take infinite paynes, and commit manye
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unlawfull actes.... But among these symple soules, a
fewe clothes serve the naked: weightes and measures
are not needeful to suche as can not skyl of crafte and
deceyte, and have not the use of pestiferous money, the
seede of innumerable mischeeves: so that yf we shall
not be ashamed to confesse the trueth, they seeme to
live in that golden worlde of the whiche olde wryters
speake so muche, wherein menne lyved symplye and in-
nocentlye without enforcement of lawes, without quarre-
lying, judges and libelles, content only to satisfie nature,
without further vexation for knowledge of thynges to
come.... They are content with so lytle, that in so large a
countrey they have rather superfluitie than scarcenesse:
so that (as we have sayde before) they seeme to lyve in the
golden worlde without toyle, lyvynge in open gardens,
not entrenched with dyches, divided with hedges, or de-
fended with walles; they deale truely one with another
without lawes, without bookes, and without judges...17
Francesco Guicciardini, in his Storia d’Italia (1537-1540)
would say of native Americans that ’they had no know-
ledge (scientia) and no experience whatsoever of things’.
As Margaret T. Hodgen has shown, citing these and
other examples from the early sixteenth century, such de-
scriptions constituted ‘conventionalised statements’,18
whichwere not unique to any one author, nor particularly
philosophical in orientation. The barbarous or savage
Other was defined by the privation of certain enumer-
able elements of European civilisation: law, property,
sovereign power, the mechanical arts, agriculture, math-
ematics, writing, and so on and so forth. As Stephen
Greenblatt remarked in his perceptive study of linguistic
colonialism, ‘The mention of the nakedness of the Indi-
ans is typical; to a ruling class obsessed with the sym-
bolism of dress, the Indians’ physical appearance was a
token of a cultural void. In the eyes of the Europeans, the
Indians were culturally naked. This illusion that the inhab-
itants of the New World are essentially without a culture
of their own is both early and remarkably persistent, even
in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence.’19
The framing division between bios and zoe, political life
and ‘bare’ life, identified in Agamben’s Homo Sacer, was
manifest here in all its raw literalism (although, as we
shall further detail below, the postulate of the cultural
and political bareness of the Indians was not shared by
all European philosophers).
Now, this particular convention, the negative
itemising of difference, is nigh-on ubiquitous from the
sixteenth century onwards, and can be registered across
traveller’s chronicles, and in Enlightenment encyclopae-
dias and dictionaries, and from Kant’s anthropology to
Darwin’s voyages. To take just one striking example,
from the Franciscan missionary Louis Hennepin’s Nou-
veau voyage d’un pais plus grand que l’Europe:
The Apostolick Man [missionary] ought much more to
acknowledge this dependance upon the Soveraign Lord,
in respect of those barbarous Nations who have not any
regard of any Religion true or false, who live without
Rule, without Order, without Law, without God, without
Worship, where Reason is buried in Matter, and incap-
able of reasoning the most common things of Religion
and Faith. Such are the people of Canada. … They live
without any subordination, without Laws or any form
of Government or Policy. They are stupid in matters of
Religion, subtle and crafty in their Worldly concerns; but
excessively superstitious.20
Missing from Hennepin’s list of negations is a leit-
motiv found inmany of the others, that the savages know
neither thine nor mine, that they are peoples without
property. Among innumerable examples (taken mainly
from Landucci, Ellingson and Hodgen), we encounter it
in:
• The Dutch geographer Joannes de Laet’s 1633
Novus Orbis: ‘[they have] no laws, no political in-
stitutions, they act like animals’.
• The 1694 Dictionary of the Académie Française:
‘Savage, also said of peoples who usually live in the
woods, without religion, fixed abode and rather
more like beasts than animals’.
• In the soldier-explorer Baron de Lahontan’s 1706
Mémoires de l’Amérique Septentrionale, in the
chapter ‘Moeurs et Manières des Sauvages’ (Mores
and Manners of the Savages): ‘They have neither
laws, nor judges, nor priests’; ‘The Savages know
neither yours nor mine’.
• In the naturalist Buffon’s 1749 Variétés dans l’Es-
pece humaine: ‘no rule, no law, nor master, nor
habitual society’.
• In Louis de Jacourt’s entry Sauvages for Diderot’s
Encyclopaedia (1765): ‘barbarian peoples who live
without law, police or religion, and who have no
fixed abode’.
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• Leibniz in the same year, in the New Essays Con-
cerning Human Understanding: ‘Even with regard
to the soul, their practical morality can be said to
be in some respects better than ours, because they
have neither greed for the accumulation of goods nor
ambition to dominate.’
• Kant, in the lecture notes from his courses on
philosophical anthropology of the 1770s: ‘The
American people are incapable of civilisation.
They have no motive force; for they are without
affection and passion’.21
• Charles Darwin on the inhabitants of Tierra del
Fuego in 1839: ‘The different tribes have no gov-
ernment or chief; yet each is surrounded by other
hostile tribes, speaking different dialects, and sep-
arated from each other only by a deserted border
or neutral territory: the cause of their warfare ap-
pears to be the means of subsistence. … They can-
not know the feeling of having a home, and still
less that of domestic affection; for the husband is
to the wife a brutal master to a laborious slave. …
How little can the higher powers of the mind be
brought into play: what is there for imagination
to picture, for reason to compare, for judgment to
decide upon?’22
If Europeans preoccupied with hierarchical codes of
dress and appearance were culturally confounded by the
savage’s nakedness, viewing the indigenous populations
of the Americas through the lens of law and property
meant that where social and political relations were sup-
posed to be, all that actually appeared was absence and
lack. Yet, as Hodgen has noted, there is nothing particu-
larly modern (or exclusively European) about this ethno-
centric logic of contrast with the Other, who only exists
as a negative or inversion of the Self. She encounters
it in the twelfth-century Old French Roman d’Alexandre,
where the Indian ‘brahmin’ were described as having ‘no
agriculture, no iron, no building, no fire, no bread, no
wine, no clothing, nor anything pertaining to the pro-
ductive arts or pleasure’.23 She also finds it in Ancient
Roman andGreek accounts of the nomadic Scythians (not
by accident among the fantastic ancestors postulated by
European writers for the Amerindian populations), who
were said by Strabo in the first century BC to ‘know noth-
ing about the storing of food, or about the peddling of
merchandise either, except for the exchange of wares
[barter]’, and whom Homer before him described as men
‘who by no means spend their lives on contracts and
money-getting, but actually possess all things in com-
mon. . . and above all things have their wives and their
children in common’.
The sheer monotony of comparative negation is no
surprise, if we reflect on the extent to which Renais-
sance and early modern thinkers interpreted the world
through a framework compounded from Ancient Roman
and Greek traditions, along with their Biblical hybrids.
Particularly when it comes to their apparent ignorance
of private property and its social consequences, the New
World ‘savage’ is enduringly haunted both by ancient
utopias of the Golden Age and by classical figures of bar-
barism. AsHaydenWhite has suggested, in his suggestive
study of the ‘forms of wildness’ that preceded the emer-
gence of the modern figure of the savage, what we are
dealing with in this pattern is a ‘technique of ostensive
self-definition by negation’, in other words with the cre-
ation of antitypes.24 From a certain angle, the modern
‘savage’ could be seen as the illusory realisation of the
fantastic figure of the wild man which had menaced and
enlivened the real and psychic margins of European cul-
tures in antiquity and the middle ages. Did anything
uncanny remain in the formalisation, projection and spa-
tialisation of the pre-colonial homo sylvaticus onto the
native peoples of the Americas, anything that would con-
front a colonising rationality with the experience of its
limits?
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We might be tempted to single out the ‘noble sav-
age’ as one such obstacle to cognitive imperialism, but
that identification would be mistaken. As Ter Elling-
son, and before him Arthur Lovejoy,25 Giuliano Gliozzi
and Michèle Duchet have all detailed, the ‘noble sav-
age’ is largely a retroactive and negative ideological con-
struction; nineteenth-century pro-imperialist anthropo-
logical and philosophical polemicists attacked the ‘myth
of the noble savage’as a confected proxy for their assaults
on the rather more imposing revolutionary legacies of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau – who had himself never used
that formulation, and who crucially differentiated the
primitive state of nature from the social reality of North
American populations. As Ellingson notes, the nexus
between nobility and savagery was a short-lived and idio-
syncratic product of Marc Lescarbot’s experience in ‘New
France’ in the early seventeenth century:
Rather than an idealised equation ofmoralitywith nature,
[the noble savage] was a technical concept based on legal
theory, attempting to account for the problem of societ-
ies that could exist in the absence of anything Europeans
might recognise as legal codes and institutions, by pro-
jecting amodel drawn fromEuropean ‘nobility’ that could
satisfactorily account for the absence of a wide range of
European-style political and legal constructs. And rather
than being associated with an idealisation of ‘savage’
peoples or promotion of them to the status of exemplars
for revealing European corruption, it was instead offered
in the context of a colonialist project that would promote
European dominance, guided by a salvage ethnology that
would show later generations how their forefathers had
lived, once the inevitable destruction of their culture had
been achieved.26
What comes to be misrecognised as a myth of the noble
savage, as Ellingson concludes, is rather the sign of ‘the
lingering transformations of the Golden Age discourse of
comparative negation and the dialectic of vices and vir-
tues, playing itself out in oscillating interaction with the
opposing energies and increasingly negativising forces of
Enlightenment sociocultural evolutionary progressivism
and nineteenth-century racism’.27
Building on a suggestion by Duchet, we could further
argue that to the extent that the reality of the savage
world is trapped in a ‘network of negations’ – negations
that serve as screen and mirror for the ‘Other’s Other’,
the internally conflicted ‘Self’ of a Europe in cultural
and political tumult – it is the very formalism of these
negations which opens them up to a quasi-structuralist
play of combinations and inversions of valence, as well
as the emergence of various negative utopias.28 As I will
explore below, it matters to the historical mutation in
the figure of the savage which negations take precedence.
First and foremost, is the savage negatively the human
without property (or else, positively,with common pos-
sessions), without religion (or with non-monotheistic
spiritual practices), without government (or with equal-
ity), without industriousness (or with freedom)?
As I have just intimated, the negations can also be
inverted, in either a critical or a utopian guise, namely in
the form of what Anthony Pagden has termed the ‘savage
critic’, the reversal of the savage as negative stereotype,
the negation of the negation of the civilised.
The savage was believed to live in a world of his ownmak-
ing, a world of extremes, of inexplicable and frequently
repellent ritual behaviour, a world controlled by passion
rather than reason. The literary image of what I shall call
the savage critic is, in a number of crucial respects, an
inversion of this stereotype. The fictitious Mexicans of
Dryden, Sir WilliamDavenant’s Peruvians, the Huron and
the Incas of Voltaire, Diderot’s Tahitians, Denise Vairasse
d’Alais’s Australians, the Huron of the Baron de Lahontan
(to take a random sample) all claim in their attacks upon
the world of civil men that it is we, not they, who have
failed to see what is written in the book of nature: that
in the end it is we who have failed to grasp what it means
to be human.29
As concerns utopia instead – and as White has aptly
noted about the very idea of wildness – in moments of
cultural, political and economic crisis, the antitype can
become a positive type, even, we could add, a kind of
prototype. Rather than a positive valuation of indigenous
Amerindian societies (though this is not wholly absent,
for instance from the writings of missionaries like the
Jesuit Charlevoix) the ‘nobility’ (in the sense of affirmat-
ive value) of the savage lies in its negativity. By now, I
imagine some readers may have already heard echoing,
across the ‘litanies of comparative negation’, the liber-
tarian communist slogan: ni dieu, ni maître, no Gods, no
masters.
This negative dialectic of savage dystopia and colo-
nial utopia is present in what is perhaps the most well-
known literary instantiation of the savage as comparat-
ive negation of the civilised. This is Gonzalo’s evocation,
in Act 2 Scene I of Shakespeare’s Tempest, of the anti-
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political ‘commonwealth’ he would impose, had he the
chance, on Prospero’s island:
I’ the commonwealth I would by contraries
Execute all things; for no kind of traffic
Would I admit; no name of magistrate;
Letters should not be known; riches, poverty,
And use of service, none; contract, succession,
Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none;
No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil;
No occupation; all men idle, all;
And women too, but innocent and pure;
No sovereignty;--
[…]
All things in common nature should produce
Without sweat or endeavour: treason, felony
Would I not have; but nature should bring forth,
Of its own kind, all foison, all abundance,
To feed my innocent people.
As Shakespeare scholars began to notice in the late
eighteenth century, and continue to discuss to this day,
the speech appears as a détournement of Montaigne’s
‘Des Cannibales’ – though Hodgen has argued power-
fully for the position that if this is indeed the case, then
Shakespeare borrowed from the least original, most con-
ventional of Montaigne’s musings on the ethico-political
lessons of Brazilian anthropophagy. What is perhaps
more telling in The Tempest is that this is a European’s
utopia, of the island as tabula rasawhere onemay elide or
invert civilisation and its discontents; it is not a descrip-
tion of the ‘natives’, who receive in the figure of Caliban
a far more pejorative, but also far more unsettling image.
We are in the presence here perhaps of a kind of sec-
ondary or imaginary colonisation, one that projects onto
‘savage’ colonised lands, spatialising it, a European desire
for the negation of his own civilisation – a desire which,
as White suggests, inverts the valence of the antitype
in moments of cultural crisis. Shakespeare in a sense
punctures the sureties of this colonial utopian imagina-
tion with the interjection of Antonio’s Realpolitik: ‘The
latter end of his commonwealth forgets the beginning’.
Gonzalo’s withering away of the state in the colonies
forgets that the birth of the commonwealth is a matter of
‘treason, felony, sword, pike, knife, gun’. When in 1969
the Martinican anti-colonial poet and politician Aimé
Césaire adapted Shakespeare’s play in his ownA Tempest,
the words he put in Gonzalo’s mouth also spoke to the
limits of his negative and primitivist colonial utopia:
I mean that if the island is inhabited, as I believe, and if
we colonise it, as is my hope, then we have to take every
precaution not to import our shortcomings, yes, what
we call civilisation. They must stay as they are: savages,
noble and good savages, free, without any complexes or
complications. Something like a pool granting eternal
youth where we periodically come to restore our aging,
citified souls.30
SavageWarre, or, reading Thomas Hobbes
in Virginia
I haven’t forgotten about political philosophy, or its his-
tory, and it seems fitting now, having touched on the
dialectic of political realism and anti-political idyll in
The Tempest, to turn to that most fiercely anti-utopian
of modern philosophers, Thomas Hobbes, a crucial au-
thor in Landucci’s narrative. With Hobbes, we can
briefly explore how notwithstanding the seemingly trans-
historical invariance and portability of the savage as anti-
type, seemingly analogous negations can be the bear-
ers of very different philosophical contents and projects.
Four decades after Shakespeare’s Tempest, Hobbes’s Le-
viathan depicted the state of nature in the following well-
known terms:
during the time men live without a common Power to
keep them all in awe, they are in a condition which is
called Warre.... In such condition, there is no place for
Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and con-
sequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor
use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and re-
moving such things as require much force; no Knowledge
of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall
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feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.31
Modern political philosophy is arguably born of a
matrix of negations, juxtaposing an imaginary at once
formalistic and terrifying of pure privation in the state
of nature to the imperative necessity of the State, that
artificial man. Though Hobbes, who was personally in-
volved in the colonial enterprise as a stockholder of the
Virginia Company,32 spoke of the ‘savages of America’
sparingly, he did so at crucial points in his oeuvre, and,
as Landucci forcefully argues, the role of ethnological ac-
counts of North American forms-of-life in shoring up or
verifying Hobbes’s political anthropology should not be
underestimated. Homo homini lupus est, was, after all, an
expression first used in a colonial travel narrative. Two
paragraphs after his famous formulation ‘solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short’, anticipating the response of a
sceptical reader, he notes:
It may peradventure be thought there was never such a
time nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was
never generally so, over all the world: but there are many
places where they live so now. For the savage people in
many places of America, except the government of small
Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust,
have no government at all; and live at this day in that
brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be
perceivedwhatmanner of life therewould be,where there
were no common Power to feare; by the manner of life
which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull
government use to degenerate, into a civill Warre.33
A number of elements of Hobbes’ use of the savage
antitype are worth pausing on. Hobbes firmly rejected
Aristotle’s political anthropology and psychology – the
one that had served as a bulwark for the Spanish human-
ist and theologian Sepúlveda’s juridical arguments about
the Indians as ‘natural slaves’.34 He did so by affirming
the thoroughly artificial character of politics: human
beings are not ‘political animals’. The state, like property
itself, is a thoroughly artificial institution, whereas if we
can speak of a ‘natural’ state among human beings this
will be a state of civil war. In Hobbesian political philo-
sophy the rejection of a natural political disposition is
accompanied by the assertion of an instituted identity,
both artificial and ineluctable, between social life and
life under a state.
Hobbes’s first important work had been a remarkable
translation of Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian
War, a text in which armed strife within the city, stásis,
is a pervasive theme.35 He would project the spectre of
internecine war within the horizon of the European city
or state, be it ancient Athens or contemporary England,
into his selective sampling of travel narratives of the
Americas. Hobbes depicted the life of the ‘savages of the
Americas’ as one of permanent warfare and insecurity,
discouraging all productive and propertied activity. One
may wonder whether Hobbes’s fearsome images of North
American warfare were more a function of the frightened
reports of anti-colonial resistance, as manifested in the
Virginia Company’s own Jamestown settlement in 1622,
than any account of indigenous practices of conflict and
warfare. Though he certainly situated the savage of the
Americas on an inferior rung in the hierarchy of the civil-
ised ‘arts’, Hobbes, like his seventeenth-century rational-
ist contemporaries, maintained an ultimately homogen-
eous and paradoxically egalitarian philosophical anthro-
pology. Social and political differences were necessary
and salutary, but they were not natural.
Such an approach also implied that one could read
the past of European countries themselves in the con-
temporary savage condition. The perception of the Other
as ‘allochronic’, living in an other time, and in a space
other than time, which Johannes Fabian juxtaposed to
the notion of non-Western cultures as ‘coeval’, was later
constitutive of the anthropological gaze.36 It is painfully
manifest in the widespread figure of the savage as a kind
of ‘living fossil’. Pierre Clastres identifies this perspect-
ive as the ‘ancient Western conviction… that history is
a one-way street, that societies without power are the
image of what we have ceased to be, and that for them
our culture is the image of what they have to become’.37
This theme, later crystallised in Locke’s dictum ‘In the
beginning, the whole world was America’, makes an im-
portant appearance in the 1642 Elements of Law, where
Hobbes writes of ‘the experience of savage nations that
live at this day, and by the histories of our ancestors, the
old inhabitants of Germany and other now civil coun-
tries, where we find the people few and short lived, and
without the ornaments and comforts of life’.38
This European introjection of the ‘savagery’ projec-
ted onto the Americas is iconographically evident in the
frontispiece to Hobbes’s De Cive, which visually quotes
De Bry’s engravings for Thomas Hariot’s 1588 A Briefe
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and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia (Fig.
1).39 The juxtaposition of sovereign Imperium on the left,
with its accoutrements of production, science and law to
savage Libertas on the right (the two capped by the reli-
gious sphere, depicted as a sphere of political domination
and judgment) could not be a pithier counterpart to the
practice of comparative negation, while at the same time
indicating the openly repressed utopian dimension of
modern political philosophy, which, in Hobbes but also
Locke and Adam Smith after him, recognises that order,
law and production can only be secured at the cost of free-
dom. The iconography also shows us howmuch European
imaginings of the Americas were steeped in a classical
visual and political culture, one which, in the case of De
Bry’s compendium, made graphic the link between New
World and Old World ‘savagery’ in a way that matched
Hobbes’s reflection in the Elements, by including a series
of plates of ancient inhabitants of the British isles, the
Picts, in their own ‘state of nature’ (Fig. 2; see over).40
At a more theoretical level, attention to Hobbes’s
own use of the savage antitype suggests that, rather than
operating an ethnocentric invariant across Western his-
tory, the figure of the savage shifted in historically and
politically significant ways, and that these shifts were
articulated, at least in part, in terms of a hierarchy of
negations. In other words, though Hobbes’s list largely
matches Montaigne, and indeed echoes the Ancient and
Mediaeval examples adduced by Hodgen, one negation
reigns supreme: the negation of the state. It is from this,
the savage absence of sovereign government, that stem
all the other apparent privations: laws, property, secur-
ity, agricultural development, productive labour, the arts,
and so on. Contrast the dislocation of this hierarchy by
Locke, for whom it is the absence of property in land
which is the dominant negation, from which the others,
especially that of government, then follow.
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This recombination of comparative negation, from
the problem of political order to that of productive develop-
ment, will be crucial inmoving beyond themoral axiomat-
ics of comparative negation, flipping between dystopian
denigration and deromanticised utopia, towards a histor-
ical andmaterialist problematic of social development, in
which means of subsistence serve as the basis on which
the superstructure of laws, property, government, the
arts and religion rests.41 This paradigm, grounded in the
Lockean ideology of property, and contradictorily pres-
aged in Rousseau’s anthropological speculations, will be
fundamental to the development of classical political
economy and its attendant philosophical anthropology,
above all in the work of the Scottish Enlightenment, from
Robertson’s History of America to Adam Smith’s writings
on law, history and economics.
For Landucci (as for Ronald Meek, in his largely con-
gruent study42), and notwithstanding all of its shortcom-
ings, the bourgeois social science in which the savage is
a figure of ‘development’ will mark a crucial step beyond
the formalistic inversion of civilised type and barbar-
ous antitype, in the direction of a positive knowledge of
social and cultural change and conflict. This ‘progress-
ive’ history, in which the Scottish Enlightenment stands
as Marxism’s scientific precursor, has to incorporate a
little too quickly and smoothly the acknowledged fact
that modern racism is a key function of the shift from a
rationalist to a socio-historical conception of the ‘sav-
age’. But it must also, to my mind, underplay how a
framework of comparative negation is transmuted but
not abandoned in the proto-ethnological philosophy of
the Scottish Enlightenment. This is manifest above all
in the endurance of the Lockean axiom that from the ab-
sence of property derive all of the other absences, lacks
and lags that pertain to the savage condition. It is also
demonstrated in the extremely selective way in which
the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment assimilated
and ‘edited’ the travel narratives of Jesuit missionaries
in North America, for instance to minimise agricultural
practices or marginalise the record of collective political
deliberation, in order to underwrite the hierarchy of neg-
ations that Locke had put in place. These are some of the
ideological devices that have enforced a settler-colonial
relation in which, to Audra Simpson, ‘to be Indigenous
is to be structured into [a] position of scarcity’.43
A political miracle?
We should thus question the postulate, undergirding Lan-
ducci’s research, according to which historicism or devel-
opmentalism, even if lacedwith the propertied ideologies
of racial capitalism, is to be preferred to rationalism or
scepticism, if only as a precursor of historical material-
ism. Or at the very least, we might take the prevalence
of such a view in critical historiographies of the philo-
sophical savage to impel a more self-critical perception
of the survivals within Marxism of a stageism built on
the implicit negation of indigenous forms of life. We
can nevertheless draw an important lesson from Lan-
ducci’s text, where he identifies the key turning point
in the history of European philosophy’s conceptualisa-
tion of the savage in the thesis –made with reference to
missionary travel narratives originating from Jesuits in
so-called ‘New France’– that there can be societies without
a state. The sharpest statement of this anti-Hobbesian
argument, which seeks to counter the identification of
social life with governed life that dominates European
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political thought from Aristotle’s zoon politikon onwards,
is to be found in a text of Leibniz from 1711, a response to
the writings of the Baron de Lahontan, where the author
of theMonadology writes that:
The Iroquois and the Huron… have reversed the excess-
ively universal political maxims of Aristotle and Hobbes.
They have shown… that entire Peoples can live without
magistrates and without quarrels. … But the rudeness
of these Savages shows that it is not so much necessity
but the inclination to go towards the good and approach
happiness, by mutual assistance, that is the foundation
of Societies and States.44
Ayear earlier, in a letter also engaging with his reading of
Lahontan, Leibniz had subverted the logic of comparative
negation even more thoroughly, writing that
It is entirely truthful … that the Americans of these re-
gions live together without any government but in peace;
they know no fights, nor hatreds, nor battles, or notmany,
except against men of different nations and languages.
I would almost say that we are dealing with a political
miracle, unknown by Aristotle and ignored by Hobbes.45
Whatever the ‘truthfulness’of such claims, Leibniz’smen-
tion of a political miracle opens up a possibility distant
from most European and philosophical responses to the
encounter with the indigenous populations of the Amer-
icas. Rather than a negation of Europe and its notions
of the political – a negation that may have utopian or
subversive valences, but ones that belong to an imagin-
ary repertoire immanent to Greco-Roman and Judeo-
Christian sources – the encounter with North American
societies may require thinking of a different, unpreced-
ented politics. As many commentators have detailed, the
colonial encounter with the indigenous populations of
the Americas was marked, in the intellectual sphere, by
assimilation to the models, myths, conceptual imaginar-
ies and formal taxonomies that populated the European
mind in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries and bey-
ond, an encounter in which comparativism was laced
with the violence of an imperialist instrumental ration-
ality. In this sense, the idea of the savage largely served
as a screen on which to project the reflection of a Europe
wracked by the emergence of capitalism and its contra-
dictions, as well as by the crisis of Christian political
theology. The ‘savage’ was a kind of inverted mirror in
which European intellectuals could pose the enigmas of
the age: What is politics? What is law? What is religion?
What is property?
Very rarely was there a sense, as in Leibniz’s ‘political
miracle’, that the people of the Americas could actually
impel Europe to dislocate or expatriate its political philo-
sophy. In a sense, European intellectual life would have
to wait until the second half of the twentieth century,
with the emergence of radical and anti-statist trends
in anthropology, to give the ‘savage’ pride of place in a
critique of the dominant image of the political. In this
regard, Pierre Clastres’s 1974 Society Against the State
could be read as an extended elaboration of the anti-
Aristotelian and anti-Hobbesian effects of the encounter
with Amerindian people glimpsed by Leibniz.46 From his
field work among the Guayaki Indians in Paraguay, and
the observations of so much anthropological work across
the Americas, Clastres would draw a drastic challenge to
the political anthropology of the West. This challenge
stemmed from the ubiquity, in both North and South
America, of societies where political power was not syn-
onymous with the dialectic of obedience and command,
with the monopolisation of violence and the separation
of a distinct, state-bound political sphere. Clastres would
even go so far as portraying Amerindian forms of chief-
dom as collective stratagems to prevent the emergence
of politics as sovereign domination. As he commented:
‘One is confronted, then, by a vast constellation of so-
cieties in which the holders of what elsewhere would
be called power are actually without power; where the
political is determined as a domain beyond coercion and
violence, beyond hierarchical subordination; where, in a
word, no relationship of command-obedience is in force.
This is the major difference of the Indian world.’47
Yet it would also be erroneous to treat the modern
philosophical discourse on the savage as mere ventrilo-
quism or monologue. Balibar’s comments on the oth-
ering of the Orient are apropos here, especially in his
reminder that an encounter at the level of the imaginary
is an encounter nonetheless:
Does imaginary mean that the Other is a pure fiction, a
pure projection of theWesternmind upon ‘Orientals’who
can’t help it, who are entirely left outside of the picture
that is supposed to picture them, or is it the case that
within this imaginary frame an actual encounter does
take place, conflictual to be sure, but also in a sense ‘real’,
which would imply that the ‘real others’ also somehow
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contribute to the construction of the idea of Otherness,
albeit in a ‘subaltern’ place, but which can involve irre-
ducible difference? … The imaginary of which the idea
of ‘Orient’ is the product, contradictorily combines a real
encounter (if only an encounter with real texts, with the
writing of the Other) and a denial of the reality of the
encounter, indeed of its very possibility. Or, to put it in
Althusserian terms, that it combines recognition with a
misrecognition, each taking place within the limits and
in the language of the other.48
As Giuliano Gliozzi noted in his methodological cri-
tique of Landucci’s book,49 while a history of ideas may
lead us to suppose that, at least until the full deploy-
ment of colonial anthropology, the debate about the
‘savage’ was largely an intra-European discussion about
the nature of humanity, a critical history of ideology
shows us that European ideas and philosophies were
deeply affected by the shifting demands of the colonial
relations that Europe forced on so many other parts of
the world. In Gliozzi’s monumental study of the seem-
ingly bizarre Biblical and counterfeit genealogies that
European powers projected onto Amerindian popula-
tions to shore up the justificatory and juridical demands
of their colonial policies – genealogies that sought the
ancestors of the peoples of the Americas in the Tribes of
Israel, pre-Adamite creation, the inhabitants of Atlantis,
Jews, Tartars, Norwegians, the Dutch or the Welsh…50 –
we see how unintelligible the colonial history of anthro-
pology and philosophy would be if we fail to investigate
its articulations in relation to very unique conjunctures
of dispossession and resistance.
For example, the Spanish conquistadors in conflict
with their crown could argue that the Aztecs were a prop-
erly political society, rather than a savage one, in order
to ground the transfer of sovereignty that they’d sup-
posedly agreed to. By the same token, the Spanish state
could support the critique of Aristotle’s natural slavery
or refute the conquistadors’ tale of the natives as sinful
descendants of Jews – not out of a humanitarian concern
with historical or anthropological truth, but because they
neededwage-labourers to pay taxes to theirmetropolitan
sovereign. Or, to return to our starting point, attentive-
ness to ideological conjunctures can reveal that behind
Montaigne’s redeployment of the logic of comparative
negation, and his seemingly anti-colonial scepticism re-
garding claims of American barbarism and European su-
periority, lay a French Huguenot tradition of opposition
to, and competition with, the hegemony of Spanish colo-
nialism–whence the vociferous attacks on the genocidal
nature of the conquista. But also that Montaigne’s philo-
sophy implied its own ‘civilising’ project, one in which
recognition of difference remained the prelude to an
apologia for the supposedly ‘gentle’ virtues of an emer-
gent French colonial project. As Pocock has noted, the
‘Enlightenment could deny history to others even as it as-
serted their humanity …writing a histoire philosophique
in which Europe was denounced for its imposition of his-
tory on a world of nature, but a histoire politique in which
Europeans alone are actors.’51
In the end, the injunction to decolonise philosophy
cannot be reduced to the goal of producing a philosophy
shorn of its colonial sediments. Rather, it demands the
unrelenting practice of working through that inexorably
imaginary and ideological space – occupied by philo-
sophy’smany andmostlymonotonous savages– inwhich
a real encounter and the denial of that encounter remain
inseparable from one another. This is a project that re-
quires both the kind of historical archaeologies and gene-
alogies that Sergio Landucci and Giuliano Gliozzi (along
withOlive Dickason,52 Michèle Duchet, Ter Ellingson and
others) have contributed to, and a critical openness to the
kind of ‘political miracles’ that Leibniz spoke of, the ones
that can help dislocate a European and state-centred
monopoly over the meaning of collective political life
– a monopoly that remains among the most enduring
legacies and present determinants of the colonial rela-
tion.53
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